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Abstract*
With the enlargement of the European Union, new bordering countries emerged in the
East which are characterized by comparatively low incomes and living standards, in-
complete democratization and a number of latent political conflicts. Against this back-
ground it can be expected that migrations from these countries into the European Union
will be growing, although a considerable part of the expected movements might be tem-
porary or circular. Focussing on the Ukraine which shares borders with four European
Union countries (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania) and which entertains migration
relations with a number of European Union member states, this study identifies the new
migration challenges at the Eastern borders of the enlarged European Union. The study
reveals, that some European Union states are particularly addressed by Ukrainian labour
migrations. Whereas high income differences and a lack of job opportunities in the
home country trigger these movements in general, they are additionally based on tradi-
tional migration patterns and network relations in states such as Germany, Poland, Hun-
gary, the Czech and the Slovak Republic. In other EU member states, such as Portugal,
Spain, Italy and Greece, the demand for low-skilled labour in segmented markets, par-
ticularly in the nontraded goods sectors of the economy seems to have primarily sup-
ported the movement of Ukrainian labour migrants. Although the European Union has
recently undertaken some efforts to develop common migration regulations, many of the
proposed policy measurements are still indeterminate, particularly in the case of low-
skilled labour movements.
*The author gratefully acknowledges financial assistance from a Bavarian Ministry of Science forost
(Forschungsverbund Ost- und Südosteuropa) grant.Migration policy challenges
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1 Introduction
The European Union is one of the most attractive parts in the world to migrate to, al-
though some European Union member states have tried to reduce and control immigra-
tion as much as possible. This situation has been reinforced by the enlargement of the
European Union which resulted in new migration challenges at its Eastern borders, fac-
ing Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. As in the case of many migrant sending
states, the new East European neighbour countries of the European Union are charac-
terized by comparatively low incomes and living standards, incomplete democratization
and a number of latent political conflicts. Against this background it can be expected
that migrations from these countries into the European Union will be growing, although
a considerable part of the expected movements might be temporary or circular, meaning
a repeated back and forth migration between sending and receiving countries. Presuma-
bly migrations in search for labour will dominate East-West movements, although eth-
nic return migrations, asylum and transit movements will also play a role. As the num-
ber of people willing to enter the European Union countries will certainly exceed the
legal opportunities, illegal migrations are likely to occur.
Past experience shows that not all member countries of the European Union are con-
fronted with a similar migration pressure from outside. Nevertheless, the free movement
of people within the territory of the European Union led to the dependence of each
member state on the immigration practice and policy of other European Union states.
This situation calls for a unified and comprehensive European Union migration policy –
a policy which has already been partly realized in the field of asylum regulations and
border control and which is currently discussed in the field of labour migration.
This study identifies the new migration challenges at the Eastern borders of the en-
larged European Union – focusing on the Ukraine which shares borders with four Euro-
pean Union countries (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania) and which entertains mi-
gration relations with a number of European Union member states. In the second part of
the study it will be examined, how migration movements have developed since the
Ukraine became independent in 1991. Against the background of theoretical considera-
tions, migration motivations and the most important countries of destination will be
portrayed. The third part reviews the discourse on the risks and chances of migrations in
the European Union and the sending region Ukraine to identify economic and political
concerns with respect to recent and potential movements. In a fourth part, the paper ex-
amines European Union migration policies currently in force and it surveys the discus-
sion on future European Union migration policy options towards the new neighbouring
countries in the East of its borders. The final part summarizes and concludes.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, Working Papers Nr.267
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2 The Ukrainian migration experience: determinants,
facts and figures
Since its independence in 1991 the Ukraine participated in international migrations
which appeared as a result of the economic and political transformations of the country
and of the fundamental geopolitical changes following the break up of the Soviet Union
(Frejka et al. 1999, Tishkov et al. 2005). Although the area of today’s Ukraine has been
involved in numerous migration movements in its history, as for example the high emi-
grations in the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries
1, followed by resettlements, forced mi-
grations and labour movements in the Soviet period, migration after independence was
unique. In a comparatively short period, the Ukraine experienced considerable immigra-
tions and emigrations because of ethnic reasons as well as refugee, transit and economic
migrations.
2.1 Determinants of migration: theoretical considerations
In many studies, international migrations are nearly exclusively related to economic
factors, such as income differentials and employment opportunities. This is rooted in the
neoclassical theory of labour migration which emphasizes the responsibility of wage
differences between different countries or regions for the movement of people. Given
free mobility, workers move from countries with lower wages to those with compara-
tively higher wages (Bauer and Zimmermann 1998). In the framework of this model,
where full employment, no migration costs and no insecurity exist and all individuals
behave rationally, the larger the wage gap between sending and receiving areas, the
more people will move. If wages increase in the sending area, migration will decrease,
whereas a wage increase in the receiving country will lead to the opposite effect. In for-
mulating a more realistic model, further theoretical work in the framework of neoclas-
sics allowed unemployment in sending and receiving areas to exist. In this case, labour
migration depends on the expected and not the absolute real wage differentials, thus
taking the chance to find a job into account (Harris and Todaro 1970).
Modelling the migration decision in a micro context, human capital theory argues in
the framework of neoclassics, but from a strictly individual point of view. This concept
focuses on individual decision-making and highlights the importance of human capital
characteristics in the migration process (Sjaastad 1962). According to human capital
theory, people move if the expected returns to individual human capital - reduced by
migration costs - are bigger in the immigration than in the home country. Incorporating
migration costs which include the costs for travelling, information and income losses, as
well as the psychological costs of leaving family, friends and the home country envi-
ronment, obviously improves the explaining power of the model. If individual migration
                                                
1 In that time emigrants left for the United States, Argentina, Brazil and Canada as well as for Siberia and
Central Asia.Migration policy challenges
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decisions are seen in dependence of human capital characteristics, sociodemographic
factors influence the movement of people. In this framework, the demographic structure
of sending countries is an important determinant for migration movements. As young
people with a comparatively long working career ahead of them profit most from mi-
grations, it can be expected that movements are stronger the younger the age structure of
the sending countries is. This is reflected by many past and contemporary (labour) mi-
gration flows, which mostly consist of people in the beginning of their working career.
Apparently migration is a risky task, a fact that individual cost benefit approaches
allow introducing. Dependent on individual risk aversion people decide to move in
comparing a secure income at home with the expected value of earning abroad, dis-
counted by risk aversion. Similar to risk aversion, expectations on future home country
developments operate. In this context, the option value of waiting is a key argument,
suggesting that potential migrants have an incentive to wait, if they are not sure migra-
tion pays off (Burda 1995). Thus, migration decisions may become obsolete in the
longer run; given economic conditions improve in the home countries. The high rele-
vance of expectations in the context of migration decisions has been emphasized by a
recent World Bank report which found decreasing migration trends in sending countries
if people think that the quality of life there will improve (Mansoor and Quillin 2006:
13).
Rejecting a purely individual point of view and the dominance of wage differential in
explaining the movement of people, the new economics of labour migration argue that
households are the relevant decision making unit and that the failure of capital, credit
and insurance markets are primarily responsible for migration movements (Stark 1991).
In the case of developing countries rural households can only survive under market con-
ditions if they make capital investments and insure their production against risks. Like-
wise, workers in poor countries and in a number of transition economies are not (fully)
protected by governments from unemployment risks and old age pensions are not guar-
anteed. In the absence of insurance systems and functioning capital as well as credit
markets, family members are sent abroad to earn money for capital-building and risk
insurance. Consequently, the migration decision of households can be interpreted as a
portfolio strategy to diversify family incomes. In a further argument, the new economics
of migration identifies relative deprivation to determine migration movements. If
households earn a low income compared to their home country reference group, they
tend to send family members abroad to relatively improve their income position.
Whereas most economic theories refer to the labour supply side in the migration pro-
cess, some economists point to the demand for labour in segmented labour markets as
the initial incentive for international movements (Piore 1979). In advanced industrial
societies labour market segmentation is characterized by a primary labour market with
secure employment conditions, comparatively high wages and social security standards,
and a secondary labour market with a highly variable demand, low wages, little security
and difficult working conditions. Because native workers are drawn into the primary
sector of the economy and in many cases are not willing to accept secondary labour
market jobs, immigrant labour is recruited. Under these conditions a growing demand
for workers in the secondary labour market presumably leads to an increase in immigra-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, Working Papers Nr.267
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tion, since enterprises are not willing to pay higher wages and improve labour condi-
tions in secondary markets as a precondition to attract native workers. Particularly non-
traded goods sectors – that can not be outsourced and do not require a high skill level –
can be expected to be characterized by segmentation and the demand for low skilled
immigration.
In some cases, demand-driven labour migrations have been supported by govern-
mental recruitment programs or bilateral contracts. An example is the labour movement
from Southern European countries to Germany in the 1960s and 1970s which had been
initiated by the so-called guest worker policy. Since the early 1990s, Germany and some
other European Union countries again established recruitment schemes for short-term
labour by concluding bilateral agreements with East European and former Soviet Union
states.
To understand the dynamics of international migrations, network theory has argued
that across time and space migrant networks develop which stabilize and potentially
increase population movements. In this context migration networks are defined as con-
nections between migrants and non migrants in countries of destination and origin
through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community or ethnic origin. Because
networks reduce the costs and risk of movements, they are expected to increase the like-
lihood of further migrations (Massey et al. 1998: 42). The development of migration
networks influence the individual migration decision in such a way that the greater the
number of migrants a person back home in the sending area knows, the greater the prob-
ability that this person will also migrate.
Although economic factors and supporting network relations have been proven to be
key determinants in explaining international migrations (Mayda 2005), they have short-
comings. In a number of cases these are related to the fact that migration theories argue
in the context of a world without migration barriers. In reality, however, migration poli-
cies and institutional barriers play a decisive role in channelling international move-
ments (Hatton and Williamson 2002). Consequently state policy has to be introduced
into migration models to capture the effects of legal migration regulations (Hollifield
2000). A further conceptual extension is needed in the case of refugee and (ethnic) re-
turn movements, which are closely related to political and ethno-national migration mo-
tivations, although economic hardship may play a role as well. Because of (civil) wars,
political instabilities, national conflicts and ethnic discriminations in sending areas peo-
ple are driven out, while asylum laws, citizenship regulations and the ethnic affinity of
returning migrants towards receiving states act as pull factors. These migration determi-
nants are best modelled in the framework of considerations which reflect historical,
ethno-national and political preconditions in sending and receiving countries.
Although the theories described above focus on different levels of analysis and built
on different assumptions and scientific disciplines, they are not mutually exclusive. To
explore the complex determinants of empirical migration movements it is reasonable to
draw on a combination of theoretical argumentations in identifying the economic, social
and legal aspects that drive international movements.Migration policy challenges
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2.2 Migration in the Ukraine: empirical evidence
In the two years following independence, the Ukraine experienced a high positive net
migration which slowed down significantly in 1993 and turned negative between 1994
and 2004. In the year 2005 – after eleven years of out migration – a small migration sur-
plus was achieved (see figure 1).
2
Immigration into the Ukraine reached its peak in the year 1992 when more than half a
million persons entered, most of them coming from the successor states of the USSR
(Malynovska 2006). In subsequent years the number of immigrants decreased continu-
ously, achieving its so far lowest figure (38 500) in 2004. As in the case of immigration,
emigration was highest in the beginning of the nineties. With nearly 346 000 persons
leaving, emigration mounted in 1994, slowing down year by year afterwards. Overall the
Ukraine lost 246 000 people as a result of officially registered migration movements
between 1991 and 2005 (TransMONEE 2006).














Sources: TransMONEE 2006 database, State Statistics Committee of Ukraine
In the nineties a considerable number of border crossings occurred between the Ukraine
and (neighbouring) states with no visa regime such as Poland and Hungary which were
                                                
2 The data presented here refer to the TransMONEE 2006 data base. In a number of years (1991, 1993,
1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001) the TransMONEE data differ from official Ukrainian
migration statistics, presumably because of a different definition of immigrants with respect to citizenship
categories. As negative net migration data delivered by the Ukrainian statistical office are higher in the
respective years than those of TransMONEE it is suspected that a considerable number of ethnic Ukraini-
ans who returned to the Ukraine from the former Soviet Union had not been counted as immigrants by the
State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, Working Papers Nr.267
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not reflected by migration statistics. These movements consisted of short-term, circular
trips undertaken by people engaged in petty-trade (shuttle trade). On both sides of the
border, Ukrainian citizens bought and sold goods to profit from price and exchange rate
differences. According to opinion polls conducted in the middle of the 1990ies regular
trips abroad to improve income and living standard had become a key business activity
for approximately 5% of the economically active population in the Ukraine while 20%
of the working-age population attempted these trips occasionally (Frejka et al. 1999: 6).
After independence immigrations into and emigrations from the Ukraine were char-
acterized by the dominance of exchange movements with former Soviet Union states,
first of all Russia. Between 1991 and 2004, over 90% of all immigrants into the Ukraine
came from post Soviet countries, whereas 75% of all emigrants left for the successor
states of the USSR (Malynovska 2006). Although overall officially registered emigra-
tion declined since 1994, the share of people leaving for the West increased from 20%
in the beginning of the nineties to 33% in 2004, confirming the growing weight of
Western, primarily European Union states as destination for migrants, leaving the
Ukraine (Malynovska 2006).
Based on the data presented above, emigrations from the Ukraine followed a de-
creasing trend since the middle of the nineties which contradicts the empirical observa-
tion that Russia as well as a number European Union countries faced an increasing im-
migration from the Ukraine in that period (see table 4). This inconsistency is due to the
fact that only persons who receive an official permission to reside abroad are registered
by Ukrainian officials as emigrants. Ukrainian citizens, who leave the Ukraine on the
base of a tourist visa, participate in bilateral agreements for short-term work or in a stu-
dent exchange program are not counted in official emigration statistics. Besides, illegal
border crossings add to an increased number of Ukrainians, living and working abroad.
3
What were the basic determinants which drove migration movements in the Ukraine
since its independence? Referring to the theoretical argumentations introduced earlier it
will be argued that a combination of ethnic and economic motivations as well as of so-
cial and legal factors were responsible for migrations in the Ukraine, although the
weight of the respective causes changed over time. Whereas ethnic and political migra-
tion motivations had been prevalent in the beginning of the migration exchange with
post Soviet states, economic determinants increasingly won in importance since the end
of the nineties. This reflects the dominance of ethnic return movements after the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union when national minorities had an opportunity to return to their
newly founded nation states. A similar pattern was observed with respect to migrations
into Western countries. While a decreasing number of emigrants left the Ukraine be-
cause of ethnic, religious and political motives, the number of people that entered West-
ern countries in search for (short-term) work grew.
Consistent with economic migration theory high differences in income between the
Ukraine and Russia as well as between the Ukraine and Western states exist, which are
                                                
3 The weak and often inconsistent data base is a general problem in documenting international migration.
This study addresses the dilemma by using various statistical sources on migrants’ stocks and flows, by
referring to estimations in the case of illegal migrations and by taking survey studies into account.Migration policy challenges
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expected to exhibit a strong migration incentive (see table 1). In 2005, for instance, the
GDP per head in the Ukraine amounted to 32% of that in Russia and to 15% of that in
the Czech Republic, providing a solid migration motivation since the middle of the
1990ies.
A look at real GDP growth rates in the Ukraine indicates an improvement of the eco-
nomic situation since the turn of the century, although the Ukrainian economy has still
not reached its size prior to transition. As in the case of developing countries where dy-
namic growing economies are consistent with high emigrations (Massey 2005) it is as-
sumed that emigration pressure in the Ukraine will not be promptly reduced in the pres-
ence of GDP growth. This is related to the economic transformation from a planned to a
market economy where the radical change of social structures encourages growth but
creates a mobile population in search for employment opportunities.
A recent World Bank report found the labour market in the Ukraine in an early stage
of transition, indicating that labour reallocation which will result in an increase in un-
employment still lies ahead. While unemployment rates in the Ukraine are not remark-
able in a transition country comparison (9% in 2003 according to ILO standards), a low
labour participation rate points to job scarcity. Less than 60% of the Ukrainian working
age population was employed in 2003 that is below the OECD average of 65% (World
Bank 2005). In recent years, many workers had been discouraged by the poor job op-
portunities in the Ukraine and have withdrawn from the officially registered labour
force. Besides working in the shadow economy, (short-term) migration is an option to
obtain gainful employment.
4
Table 1:  GPD per capita (PPP, in US $), various European countries,
Russia and Ukraine
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Germany 21 855 22 622 23 418 24 230 25 481 26 405 26 858 27 196 28 303
Italy 21 802 22 455 23 111 23 721 24 994 26 016 26 577 27 150 28 180
Spain 17 847 18 726 19 674 20 610 21 764 22 902 23 417 24 152 25 046
Greece 14 106 14 768 15 365 16 268 17 391 18 632 19 588 20 841 22 204
Portugal 14 696 15 575 16 416 17 220 18 255 18 933 18 974 18 932 19 628
Czech Rep. 13 745 13 919 13 981 14 442 15 373 16 428 17 211 18 064 19 408
Hungary 9 958 10 801 11 544 12 220 13 223 13 900 14 710 15 451 16 814
Slovakia 9 279 9 887 10 418 10 799 11 303 12 005 12 817 13 426 14 622
Poland 8 050 8 737 9 251 9 763 10 401 10 855 11 219 11 965 12 974
Russia 5 795 6 038 5 932 6 401 7 095 7 561 8 130 9 036 9 902
Ukraine 3 628 3 610 3 640 3 748 4 108 4 581 4 903 5 524 6 394
Source: United Nations Database
                                                
4 The shadow economy in the Ukraine was estimated by the World Bank to reach 54% of GDP in 2003.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, Working Papers Nr.267
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Approaching the migration decision from an individual perspective, survey studies
revealed income differences and a lack of job opportunities as the two most important
reasons for Ukrainians to emigrate. In a study conducted by the IOM in 1998, more than
half of respondents (58%) named wages as motivation to migrate and 37% referred to
good employment chances abroad (IOM 1998: 25). A very similar result was attained by
a research, the IOM organized in 2006 in Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, and
Ukraine (GfK 2006). The number one reason for working abroad was low income at
home, given by 81% of respondents, whereas a lack of job opportunities in the country
was identified second, by 60.8% of respondents (GfK 2006: 27). Furthermore, the new
economics of migration which identify the insufficiency of markets for insurance, capi-
tal and credit as root causes for migration seem to be relevant in the Ukrainian context
as well. Insurance markets are not functioning appropriately in the Ukraine and access to
credits is very limited for average families (Institute for Economic Research and Policy
Consulting 2004). This makes it attractive for people that for example plan to finance
home ownership, to overcome the deficiencies of the credit market at home by earning
an additional income abroad.
While economic arguments point to a considerable emigration pressure in the
Ukraine, which in general is not constrained by Ukrainian laws, emigration movements
are severely restricted by legal measures on the part of most receiving countries. Par-
ticularly in the context of migrations from the Ukraine into the European Union, re-
straining migration policies control the inflow of authorized (labour) movements, for
example in the context of bilateral contracts on labour migrations. Nevertheless, labour
migrants from the Ukraine can be expected to enter or work illegally in economically
better off countries, as long as basic migration incentives persist. In this context human
smuggling plays a decisive role in fostering movements into states that close their bor-Migration policy challenges
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ders towards immigrants. Furthermore, human trafficking - where criminal networks
transport men, women and children across borders for the purpose of sexual exploitation
and forced labour – is a serious problem in comparatively poor countries with a high
migration pressure. A recent U.S. Department of State report and an IOM study found
the Ukraine the most important source country of human trafficking in Eastern Europe
and Central Asia (U.S. Department of State 2006, GfK 2006).
2.2.1 The migration exchange with the successor states of
the Soviet Union
The first two years after the break up of the Soviet Union were characterized by a high
migration exchange between the successor states of the USSR, now being independent
nations. This was particularly true for the Ukraine which received 984 000 immigrants
from various parts of the former Soviet Union in 1991 and 1992 (Malynovska 2006).
Most of these immigrants belonged to the group of ethnic Ukrainians (repatriates) who
returned from Russia, Kazakhstan or Belarus. Furthermore Crimean Tatars resettled in
large numbers in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, their traditional homeland. A
remarkable part of these movements was related to (forced) migrations in earlier periods
of the Soviet era. In the 1930-50s, Ukrainians and other ethnic minorities (Crimean Ta-
tars, Germans and Poles) living in the Ukraine had been subject to deportation and
(forced) resettlement. They were sent to Northern and Eastern parts of Russia, to Ka-
zakhstan and other regions of the Soviet Union. In later years the Soviet regime actively
supported labour migrations which aimed at a population exchange within Union Re-
publics. While the Ukraine was a net immigration republic throughout the Soviet era,
ethnic Ukrainians were the most important group to leave while ethnic Russians were
the biggest group to enter. In 1989, at the time of the last Soviet census there were 6.8
million Ukrainians living in the Soviet Union outside the Ukraine, predominantly in
Russia (4.4 million) and Kazakhstan (890 000), whereas nearly half (44%) of those 11
million Russians who inhabited the Ukraine in 1989 had not been born there (State Sta-
tistics Committee of Ukraine).
In addition to groups, moving to the independent Ukraine because of ethnic and
homeland reasons, a number of immigrants looked for refuge, having escaped ethnic
tension, civil war and political conflicts in their post Soviet home countries. Among
these populations were people from Moldova, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan who
sought protection in the Ukraine which had passed a law on refugees in 1993, based on
the 1951 Geneva Convention (Malynovska 2006). In the course of the 1990s the
Ukraine became the address of refugee groups from outside the former Soviet Union as
well, which came from regions hit by (civil) wars and economic crisis such as Afghani-
stan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, African countries and the Middle East (IOM 1996: 135, Kraler￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, Working Papers Nr.267
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and Iglicka 2002: 40, Mansoor and Quillin 2006: 42). Some of these asylum seekers
found refuge in the Ukraine, others moved on to the West.
5
As in the case of immigration, emigration from the Ukraine was characterized by
ethnic return movements in the early nineties. Ethnic Russians, moving to Russia made
up the most important part of emigrants in this period. However, in the middle of the
nineties the motivation for leaving the Ukraine towards post Soviet states, primarily
Russia, changed. Against the background of the economic crisis in the Ukraine, eco-
nomic reasons were increasingly an incentive to move out of the country. In part, emi-
grants left permanently for economically better off post Soviet states, mainly Russia.
Besides, labour migrants crossed the border primarily towards Russia in search for
short-term and seasonal work. In addition to considerable GDP differences between
Russia and the Ukraine (see table 1), movements were encouraged by a common history
in the Soviet period, language proficiency and (ethnic) network relations. It is not sur-
prising, therefore that an estimated number of one million Ukrainians worked in Russia
in 2002 (Malynovska 2004: 14). Most of these migrants were occupied in semi legal and
illegal jobs in construction, agriculture and services.
Between 1991 and 2004, the Ukraine lost 1 897 500 persons who moved to post So-
viet states, while 2 229 870 entered from the successor states of the USSR (Malynovska
2006). Because these movements were primarily related to repatriations and ethnic re-
turn movements, they affected the ethnic composition of the population to a consider-
able extend (see table 2).
Table 2:  Ethnic composition of the population in the Ukraine
(in thousands, 2001, 1989)
2001 in % of the
population 2001
1989 in % of the
population 1989
Total 48 457 100.0 51 452 100.0
Ukrainians 37 541 77.8 37 419 72.7
Russians 8 334 17.3 11 355 22.1
Crimean Tatars 248 0.5 46 0.0
Poles 144 0.3 219 0.4
Jews 103 0.2 486 0.9
Armenians 94 0.2 54 0.1
Azerbaijani 45 0.1 36 0.0
Georgians 34 0.1 23 0.0
Germans 33 0.1 37 0.1
Sources: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, Vestnik statistiki, no.10, 1990
                                                
5 Because a readmission treaty has been signed between the Ukraine and the EU in the year 2006, the
Ukraine will be obliged to take back third country nationals (as well as its citizens) entering the EU ille-
gally from Ukrainian territory.Migration policy challenges
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Due to a negative natural population development and an overall net emigration be-
tween 1989 and 2001 the population of the Ukraine decreased by 5.8% in this period.
However, because of ethnic return migrations, the share of Ukrainians in the total
population which had made up 72.7% in 1989, increased to 77.8% in the year 2001. In a
similar way, the return of Crimean Tatars led to an increase of this ethnic minority by 5
times.
As census data reveal, population groups from post Soviet states that found refuge in
the Ukraine enlarged their share such as Armenians, Azerbaijani and Georgians,
whereas groups that left to their nation states lost in importance. The most prominent
example is the Russian population in the Ukraine which decreased by 26.6% between
1989 and 2001, reducing its share in the total population to 17.3% in 2002, while in
1989 it had made up of 22.1% (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine).
2.2.2 The migration exchange with Western states
Migration into Western states is not a new phenomenon for the Ukraine. As a part of the
Soviet Union, the country has experienced three waves of emigration towards the West:
After the revolution in 1917, in the course of World War II and after the 1960s. Al-
though the constitution of the USSR never contained any guarantee of freedom of
movement, Soviet legislation permitted a very limited number of people to emigrate in
the post World War II period for the purpose of reuniting families.
6 This emigration
policy was primarily the result of the intervention of foreign states on the part of groups
wishing to emigrate.
7 The main beneficiaries were Jews and Germans whose families
had been wrenched apart by the events of the war and whose potential recipient coun-
tries (the USA, Israel and Germany) supported their cause. In the case of Jews, anti-
Semitism forced people to leave, in the case of Germans, ethnic repression and forced
resettlement in earlier periods were push factors.
In October 1989, the debate over emigration policy in the Soviet Union took a new
turn. The Supreme Soviet approved a draft law on its first reading which put travel in
and out of the country for Soviet citizens on a new basis. Most importantly, the draft law
accepted reasons for emigration other than family reunion and recognized the individual
right to travel. Consequently, emigration from the Ukraine to Western countries in-
creased in 1989, reaching its so far highest number of issued permissions to leave in
1990, when 95 000 persons were allowed to depart (Frejka et al. 1999: 5). In admitting
92% of all emigrants from the Ukraine in 1990, Israel was by far the most important
receiving country in this year, followed by the USA (3%) and Germany (1.5%).
                                                
6 This refers to the "regulations on entry to and exit from the USSR" of June 1959. These rules of law
were reviewed in 1970 and again in 1986, but were not fundamentally amended.
7 In this context the Jackson-Vanik amendment (1973) played a role, impeding trade unless Jews were
allowed to leave freely. In addition the Soviet government signed the Helsinki accord (1975), pledging,
among other things, to facilitate freer movements of its citizens.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, Working Papers Nr.267
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Since the break up of the Soviet Union emigrants from the Ukraine to the West ad-
dressed new destination countries, many belonging to the European Union or becoming
a part of it after May 2004 (Pribytkova 2006). In 1994, nearly every fifth emigrant
(18%) from the Ukraine to the West chose a destination other than Israel, the United
States and Germany. This development was related to a shift from ethnic to economic
migration motivations originating in the economic crisis in the Ukraine which accompa-
nied the transformation process. A labour movement towards the West established,
which is reflected by the increase in registered labour migrants, rising from 11 800 per-
sons in 1996 to about 40 000 persons in 2002 (Malynovska 2004). Besides, a high num-
ber of illegally employed Ukrainians are working in European Union countries. Ac-
cording to estimations of Ukrainians embassies about 800 000 Ukrainian labour mi-
grants were occupied in various European countries in 2002, a considerable number of
them illegally (figure 3).
Figure 3:  Estimated numbers of Ukrainian labour migrants in Poland, Italy,











To channel the growing migration pressure and to prevent illegal labour movements,
a number of European Union states has concluded bilateral agreements on temporary
labour movements with the Ukraine or has established training programs for Ukrainian
workers. Some European Union states which recently were exposed to (illegal) labour
immigration from the Ukraine are discussing to introduce such bilateral agreements (see
table 3). In the perspective of the Ukraine, bilateral agreements on labour migration be-
came an increasingly relevant instrument to protect the rights of Ukrainian citizens
working abroad.
What were the most important receiving countries in the European Union for
Ukrainian labour migrants and which factors determined the choice of destinations?
Although data sources are limited, the inflows of Ukrainian immigrants into selected
European Union countries compiled by the OECD identify those states, which recently
attracted Ukrainian (labour) migrants (see table 4). With respect to the background of
Ukrainian immigration, the most important receiving European Union states can beMigration policy challenges
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classified into two groups, with Germany being a special case. One group consists of
new East European Union member states, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia
and Hungary which formerly belonged to the Warsaw pact. No visa regimes had existed
between these states and the Ukraine before 2003 (in the case of Slovakia before 2000),
thus facilitating border crossings, shuttle trade and short-term work. A second group that
hosts Ukrainian labour migrants includes Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece. In these
countries that transformed recently from emigration into immigration regions labour
migration from the Ukraine is a new phenomenon. Besides, Germany entertains migra-
tion relations with the Ukraine, primarily in the context of ethnic, family and refugee
movements. Other European Union member states have not admitted a considerable
number of Ukrainian (labour) migrants yet, although empirical studies point to a grow-
ing population of Ukrainians, working (illegally) in the United Kingdom and in the
Netherlands (Trades Union Congress 2004, Shakhno and Pool 2005).
Table 3:  Bilateral agreements on temporary labour migration between the
Ukraine and European Union countries
Country Agreements on temporary labour migration











Sources: OECD 2004, Cipko 2006
The new members of the European Union, for example the Czech Republic, Poland,
Hungary and Slovakia experienced little immigration in the past. However, the encour-
aging economic development in recent years and the accession to the European Union
turned them into an attractive destination for refugees and labour migrants from poorer
and more unstable regions in the East (Wallace 2002). Although Ukrainians belong to
one of the most important new immigrant groups in the Czech Republic, Poland, Hun-
gary and Slovakia, their immigration patterns differ somewhat in a country to country
comparison. In the Czech Republic, immigration from the Ukraine is characterized by
circulating labour and partly by long-term movements. Married men with a relatively
high education, coming without their families, dominate the group of Ukrainian labour
migrants in the Czech Republic. In Poland, Hungary and Slovakia migrants from the￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, Working Papers Nr.267
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Ukraine were engaged in petty trade until the middle of the 1990s while in later years
they performed primarily seasonal or short-term work (Drbohlav and Janska 2004).
Table 4: Inflows of Ukrainian citizens into various European Union countries
(in thousands)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Germany
* 13.7 12.5 14.1 15.3 18.2 20.5 20.6 17.7 15.0
Italy – – 1.0 2.8 4.1 5.1 8.1 – 11.2
Spain – – 0.2 0.6 6.3 11.0 10.8 9.1 10.3
Portugal – – – – – 45.2 16.5 2.5 0.7
Czech Rep. 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.0 2.4 13.0 23.7 15.0
Hungary 1.4 1.4 1.8 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.1 2.6 2.5
Slovakia – – – – – – – 0.7 0.7
Poland – – 0.9 2.6 3.4 4.8 6.9 8.4 10.2
* ethnic German immigrants (Aussiedler) are not included
– not available
Source: OECD 2006
Next to geographic proximity, Ukrainian labour migration into the new European
Union member states was triggered by income differences and job opportunities. In East
European Union countries neighbouring the Ukraine, a substantial demand for (sea-
sonal) unskilled labour exists which can not be satisfied by native workers. In addition,
established network relations between ethnic minorities on both sides of the border
strengthen potential movements in reducing costs and risks. In Zakarpathia (Ukraine)
for example, near to the border of Hungary, approximately 151 000 ethnic Hungarians
live, whereas the Polish minority in the Ukraine which settles near to the Polish border
consists of 140 000 people. Ethnic ties to the Ukraine prevail on the Polish side as well
where 312 000 Polish citizens are registered, who have been born in the Ukraine
(OECD 2006: 269).
In the context of global migration movements it is a puzzling question why South
European Union countries attracted Ukrainian migrants although no traditional eco-
nomic, social or cultural relations exist and a comparatively far distance has to be over-
come to reach these countries. In a European Union comparison, South European Union
countries do not display the highest wages, which otherwise could be an explanation for
the choice of this region. Nevertheless, existing income differentials between the
Ukraine and South European Union countries can be considered high enough to make
labour migrations pay off (see table 1). In addition, two further arguments have to be put
forward to explain the new movements from the Ukraine into Portugal, Spain, Italy and
Greece. On the one hand, a demand for low skilled, flexible labour exists in these coun-
tries, primarily in construction, agriculture, services and tourism. On the other hand, aMigration policy challenges
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comparatively inexperienced migration control and regularisation procedures attract
Ukrainian migrants into these regions.
8
The regularisation of immigrants is a controversially debated issue in European Un-
ion member states (Heckmann and Wunderlich 2005). While North and West European
Union countries usually oppose the legalization of illegals, South European Union states
have practiced it frequently. The basic contra argument identifies legalization as an in-
centive to further (unwanted) immigrations. However, countries with a high number of
illegals face a growing economic inequality, a loss of governmental incomes, distorted
competition and social tensions. Thus, South European Union countries with little expe-
rience in regulating and controlling immigration use legalization procedures in order to
manage migration after it has occurred. The high number of Ukrainian citizens which
participated in recent regularisation programs in South European Union member states
confirms a considerable illegal immigration from the Ukraine. In 1998 for example,
Greece legalized 9 800 Ukrainians, Italy legalized 100 100 immigrants from the Ukraine
in 2002 and Portugal 63 500 in 2001 (OECD 2005: 100).
Among European Union states that received Ukrainian immigrants in recent years,
Germany represents a unique case. According to officially registered immigrations, be-
tween 1996 and 2004 Germany has been the most important receiving country for
Ukrainian immigrants in the European Union (see table 4). This is related to the fact that
Germany entertains migration relations with the Ukraine that date back to the beginning
of the 1950ies. Since that period ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) return from the (former)
Soviet Union to Germany where they are admitted on the base of the German constitu-
tion (Dietz 2006). They are entitled to receive the German citizenship and to obtain
governmental support for economic and social integration. Although Ukraine is fourth
behind Russia, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic in sending ethnic Germans, ap-
proximately 40 000 return migrants of German origin had left the Ukraine between 1992
and 2006 to settle in Germany.
9 Next to ethnic Germans, Jewish immigrants from the
former USSR – a considerable number form the Ukraine - were admitted in Germany
since 1991 (Dietz 2004). This immigration is related to a decision of the last GDR gov-
ernment to grant asylum to Jewish citizens from the Soviet Union who had come to East
Germany because they were threatened by persecution in their home country. Following
German reunification, entry visas for Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union
were provided on the base of the so-called quota refugee regulation, guaranteeing a resi-
dence permit for an indefinite period and entitling Jewish immigrants to various rights
and integration benefits.
                                                
8 In recent years a number of efforts have been undertaken by Southern European countries to enforce
immigration control.
9 This number includes all persons who have come to Germany in the context of the ‘Aussiedler’ regula-
tion. A considerable part of them were not registered as Germans in the Ukrainian census, as they entered
Germany as non German family members of Aussiedler. In addition to the return movement of ethnic
Germans from other parts of the former Soviet Union into the Ukraine, this explains the comparatively
small decrease of Germans in the Ukraine between 1989 and 2001 (see table 2).￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, Working Papers Nr.267
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As a result of the admission regulations for ethnic Germans and Jewish refugees,
immigration from the Ukraine to Germany was predominantly related to an ethnic and
political background, although a limited number of labour migrants entered as well.
Survey studies reveal that Germany is the number one destination country for Ukraini-
ans, who plan to go abroad for work (IOM 1998, GfK 2006). Although (labour) migra-
tion from the Ukraine to Germany is strictly controlled, the increasing immigrant popu-
lation from the Ukraine in Germany fostered family reunification and attracted co-
citizens who were inclined to live and work in Germany.
With the intention to facilitate travel and visits from the Ukraine, the German em-
bassy relaxed visa procedures for Ukrainian citizens in the year 2000. As a result, the
number of Ukrainians who received a German tourist visa (Schengen visa) jumped up
(figure 4). Although the relaxation of visa procedures had been withdrawn in the year
2003, a considerable immigration of Ukrainian citizens into various European Union
countries manifested.








1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
C-Visa
D-Visa
C-Visa are short-term Schengen visa (max. 90 days) that relate to business, tourism, family visits
D-Visa are national visa for family reunification, students, au-pairs
Source: Foreign Office, Germany
In the recent decade, tourist visa regulations have been used by a number of Ukrain-
ian citizens to legally leave the Ukraine for an illegal job in European Union countries,
particular in Portugal, Italy or Spain. Furthermore, criminal networks that smuggle and
traffic people across European Union borders take advantage of tourist visa procedures.
Smuggling networks demand a substantial amount of money to transport Ukrainian citi-
zens with the help of regular tourist visa to perform illegal work in the European Union
(Cipko 2006). As recent regularisation procedures in South European Union states, for
example in Portugal, prove a high number of illegally occupied Ukrainians had enteredMigration policy challenges
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the destination region between 2001 and 2002 with a Schengen visa issued in Germany
(Baganha et al. 2004). In a similar way, survey studies with Ukrainian immigrants found
a considerable share of illegal workers in the Netherlands and in Portugal having left the
Ukraine with a German Schengen visa (Baganha et al. 2004, Shakhno and Pool 2005).
Nevertheless, no evidence exists that a great number of those Ukrainians who used a
German Schengen visa to leave the Ukraine for illegal work, actually stayed in Ger-
many.
Labour migrants from the Ukraine in the enlarged European Union earn their wages
predominately in low-skilled jobs, often on a short-term base and in economic sectors
that are typically characterized by labour market segmentation, such as agriculture, con-
struction, care and services (Drbohlav and Janska 2004, Baganha and Fonseca 2004,
Cipko 2006). This supports an argumentation introduced earlier by segmented labour
market theory which points to the demand for low paid labour in segmented markets as
a driving force for the international movement of people.
In recent years, Ukrainians citizens became an important new group in the foreign
population of some European Union countries (see table 5). They can be found in Ger-
many, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Po-
land. In the year 2004, Ukrainian citizens were among the top two foreign nationalities
in the Czech and Slovak Republic, in Hungary, Poland and Portugal (Baganha and Fon-
seca 2004, OECD 2006). In Germany, with a total foreign population of 6.7 million,
Ukrainians were on place eight in 2004, ahead of traditional migrant populations from
Spain and Portugal.
Table 5: Stock of Ukrainian citizens in various European Union countries (in thousands)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Germany 40.0 51.4 63.8 76.8 89.3 103.5 116.0 126.0 128.1
Italy 1.3 1.9 3.1 6.5 9.1 12.6 14.8 117.2 –
Greece – – – – – 13.6 – – –
Portugal – – – – – 46.4 62.0 64.8 65.8
Spain – – – – – – 26.2 – 47.6
Czech Rep. 46.3 43.4 52.7 65.9 50.2 51.8 59.1 62.3 78.3
Hungary 12.0 7.2 9.9 11.0 8.9 9.8 9.9 13.1 13.9
Slovakia 3.0 3.5 3.8 3.9 4.3 4.8 4.7 4.9 4.0
P o l a n d –– –– –– 9 . 9 ––
– not available
Sources: Portugal: Baganha and Fonseca 2004, Spain: Eurostat, others: OECD 2006
Whereas traditional international labour migrations, for example the so called guest
worker movement in Western and Northern Europe, resulted in a domination of men in
the immigrant population, this can only partly be confirmed in the case of the Ukrainian￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, Working Papers Nr.267
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population in European Union countries. Although in the Czech Republic and in Portu-
gal, the immigration from the Ukraine is dominated by men who are occupied in con-
struction and agriculture (Drbohlav and Janska 2004, Baganha and Fonseca 2004), sig-
nificantly more Ukrainian women work in Italy and Slovakia, where they are engaged in
(household) services and care. This reflects the feminisation of international migrations
in response to the growing demand for female labour
10.
Although the migration exchange between the Ukraine and Western states is nearly
exclusively characterized by an out migration from the Ukraine, a very small West-East
labour movement can be observed recently, linked to the inflow of capital and to the
establishment of various programs sponsored by international organizations. Generally,
labour migrants involved in these movements are highly-skilled professionals, experts
and specialists, mainly coming from European Union countries, Canada and the USA.
2.3 Future migration tendencies between the Ukraine
and the European Union
In recent years, the Ukraine newly appeared as a sending country of (labour) migrants
heading towards European Union states. With respect to future trends, some basic ten-
dencies can be identified which are expected to shape the migration exchange between
the Ukraine and European Union countries in the years ahead.
Against the background of persistently high income differences between the Ukraine
and European Union member states and the substantial (hidden) unemployment in the
Ukraine, labour migrations can be predicted to continue. First of all migrants performing
low skilled jobs are assumed to be involved in movements directed towards those Euro-
pean Union countries that demand flexible and short-term workers in low skilled occu-
pations. According to survey studies, potential Ukrainian migrants name a broad range
of European Union countries as target for potential labour migrations (IOM 1998, GfK
2006). This indicates the readiness of Ukrainians to move to those places where job op-
portunities have opened up. After Germany, East and South European Union states,
France and Great Britain have been identified to be particularly favoured by Ukrainian
labour migrants.
With respect to the time dimension of labour migrations, empirical studies reveal a
preference of Ukrainians towards (repeated) short-term trips and longer term temporary
labour movements (IOM 1998, Mansoor and Quillin 2006). However, in the case of
long geographic distances and restrictive migration policies in receiving countries, la-
bour migrants indicated to stay longer as wanted, because frequent back and forth
movements between destination and home country may be related to high risks and
costs (Shakhno and Pool 2005).
                                                
10 The increasing number of women participating in the labour force of advanced economies creates the
demand for low paid female migrants who work in care and household services. This phenomenon has
been described as global care chain (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002).Migration policy challenges
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As a general trend, irregular labour migrations between the Ukraine and a number of
European Union countries can be assumed to persist. This has to be understood against
the background of a considerable migration pressure in the Ukraine which is not con-
trolled by Ukrainian laws any more, while European Union countries stick to a strict
migration regime, opening few options for legal labour migrants. At present, only a
small part of labour migrations are based on bilateral (guest worker) agreements, to
meet the labour market demands of receiving European Union states in a regulated way.
Nevertheless, a number of European Union countries discuss the introduction of bilat-
eral agreements on short-term and seasonal labour migrations with the Ukraine.
Whereas in the view of European Union countries bilateral agreements are understood
as an effort to reduce illegal migrations, in the view of the Ukraine they are expected to
contribute to the protection of the rights of Ukrainian labour migrants.
A further group of migrants from the Ukraine into the European Union will consist of
refugees, (ethnic) return migrants, students and persons, eligible for family reunion. In
the case of (ethnic) return or diaspora migrants, predominantly Germany will be the
destination region. Because legal provisions for admitting ethnic Germans and Jewish
refugees from the Ukraine have recently been strengthened in Germany, these forms of
movements can be expected to decrease. With respect to family reunification the oppo-
site trend may establish, as an increasing migrant population from the Ukraine in Euro-
pean Union countries is eligible to invite following family members.
Furthermore, transit movements, passing through the Ukraine in an attempt to reach
the West, will contribute to population flows from this country into the European Union.
Because of its geographic location, its comparatively generous immigration provisions
and because of network relations with Asian and African countries, reaching back to the
Soviet period, the Ukraine has emerged as an important transit route between East and
West (Mansoor and Quillin 2006). Most migrants addressing the Ukraine for transit
have experienced (civil) war, economic crisis, ethnic repression or ecological catastro-
phes in their home countries. They come from Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, the Middle East
and a number of African states. Because the European Union has tightened border con-
trols in the East and restricted asylum regulations, many transit migrants got stuck in the
Ukraine as they failed to enter those European Union countries they had originally ad-
dressed. Primarily because of its geographic location, the Ukraine can be expected to
face considerable transit movements in the time to come.
Table 6:  Natural population development, population aged 65 and more
in the Ukraine (in percent)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
natural
population
decline -0.8 -1.9 -3.5 -4.7 -5.8 -6.0 -6.2 -6.0 -7.1 -7.6 -7.6 -7.6 -7.5 -7.0 -7.6 -6.4
population
aged 65+ 12.0 12.6 12.7 13.1 13.5 13.7 13.8 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.3 14.8 15.9 16.0
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, Working Papers Nr.267
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Although economic, social and policy factors identify the Ukraine as a potentially
important migrant sending country with respect to the European Union, the demo-
graphic development in the Ukraine speaks against high emigrations (Zimmer 2007).
Since 1991, the natural population development in the Ukraine is negative, the popula-
tion is decreasing and ageing (see table 6).
While the Ukraine lost 9.6% of its population between 1991 and 2006 due to the
natural population decline, the percentage of people over 65 increased from 12% to 16%
in the same period. Projecting the natural population development for the year 2050, the
United Nations population division found the Ukrainian population to decrease to 30.9
million people, predicting a natural population decline of 39% between 2006 and 2050,
whereas the percentage of people in the age of 65 and older would reach 27% in 2050.
In the light of this demographic perspective, the Ukraine may not be capable in the
longer run, to send large part of its working age population abroad. To the contrary, the
decline in the working-age population will create a demand for labour in the Ukraine
which most likely will have to be met by immigrants.Migration policy challenges
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3 The discourse on migration challenges in the enlarged Euro-
pean Union and the Ukraine
The policy debate on the impact of migration plays a prominent role in all European
Union countries, including the new East European Union member states. This has to be
understood against the background of the demographic development in the European
Union on the one hand and a generally reluctant attitude towards immigration in most
European Union member states on the other. While long-term demographic projections
of Eurostat point to the dependence of the future population growth in the European
Union on net migration, politicians and the public in many European Union countries
associate a number of negative economic and social consequences with the inflow of
migrants. In contrast to these perceptions the results of economic studies on the impact
of migration in receiving countries reveal a much more complex picture.
3.1 The impact of migration on receiving countries
Although the inflow of (labour) migrants bears the risk of increasing the unemployment
of natives and depressing their wages, economic research has shown that these potential
impacts depend on the labour market sectors and skill groups involved. If workers, per-
forming low skilled jobs enter, low qualified natives may face unemployment or wage
decreases (Borjas 1999). However, if immigration reacts to labour market shortages in
specific sectors or skill groups, immigrants may not crowd out natives and may have –
particularly in the case of highly-skilled workers – a positive effect on economic growth
(Bauer et al. 2004: 32). Concerning the consequences for the welfare system, migrants’
skills and employment perspectives are decisive. Whereas highly-skilled labour mi-
grants in secure labour market positions are expected to contribute to the welfare sys-
tem, low-skilled immigrants in jobs at risk are more likely to put a burden on the wel-
fare state.
Most economic studies find a comparatively low overall impact of labour migrations
on the receiving economies, although migrations hold the risk of specifically affecting
regional or sectoral labour markets (Friedberg and Hunt 1996, Longhi et al. 2005).
Rather, migrations have been identified to contribute to economic prosperity in satisfy-
ing the demand for otherwise unavailable labour in demographically aging societies
(Bauer et al. 2004: 19). In recent migrations from the new East European Union member
countries into the EU-15 immigrant workers have been found to complement native
labour and thus ease labour market shortages (Heinz and Ward-Warmedinger 2006).
Nevertheless, immigrations potentially result in a redistribution of incomes from native
workers competing with immigrant labour to natives who are complements to labour
migrants and to employers of immigrants. In the light of this consideration it is decisive
to focus on the winners and losers from migration processes (Camarota 2005: 10, IOM
2005: 168).￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, Working Papers Nr.267
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Specific problems are related with illegal labour migrations as they challenge the
concept of welfare states in the European Union in undermining the principle of soli-
darity on which the welfare states are based. Because illegal immigrants do not pay
taxes and contributions into the national social security systems, their direct impact on
publicly financed activities is negative. Furthermore, distorted competition may result as
a consequence of illegal occupations because labour costs are lower for firms hiring
illegals than for enterprises, paying official wages. Next to fiscal and economic con-
cerns, the protection of human rights of irregular migrants is a pressing issue in Euro-
pean Union societies. Modern democracies can hardly accept an - however small - part
of the population living in an extreme weak legal position, potentially subject to dis-
crimination and exploitation (Mansoor and Quillin 2006: 16).
Besides the economic impact of migration, European Union societies are confronted
with the political and cultural consequences of migration movements as well. In the case
of a high migration pressure from poor and instable countries, single European Union
states and the European Union on the supra-national level are concerned of loosing
control of borders and (national) sovereignty. This is particularly true in the case of ille-
gal migration movements or human trafficking and smuggling which recently challenge
the European Union at its Eastern borders. Furthermore, many European Union nation
states and local communities oppose migration because of an anticipated increase of
cultural diversity which is considered a challenge to national identity formation (Niessen
et al. 2005: 5).
3.2 The impact of migration on sending countries
International migrations do not only have an impact on receiving, but also on sending
states. In this context, two topics are of primary importance: the sending of remittances
and the out migration of highly-skilled workers, i.e. brain drain.
Recent studies have pointed out that remittances are increasingly relevant for the
transfer of resources to migrant sending states, predominantly in the case of developing
and transition countries, such as the Ukraine (Buch and Kuckulenz 2004, Mansoor and
Quillin 2006). After foreign investment, remittances are the second-largest source of
financial flows to developing countries and they are generally higher than development
aid (Ratha 2003). In the case of the Ukraine this trend has manifested in the year 2003,
when remittances – which had been negligible before - surpassed development aid (see
figure 5). It has to be considered though, that the official recording might severely un-
derestimate remittances in the Ukraine, as a number of Ukrainian labour migrants do not
send money back home by the banking system (Cipko 2006: 124). Particularly when the
stay of workers abroad is short or when their occupation is illegal, migrants tend to use
individual channels for sending money home.
Among other factors such as education, income level, intention to invest or to insure the
family at home against risks, the motivation of migrants to remit depends on the dura-
tion of stay. A recent study has shown that temporary migrants seem to be much moreMigration policy challenges
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concerned in sending remittances home than permanent migrants (Glytsos 1997). This
result suggests that countries as the Ukraine, where the share of short-term migrants is
high, will particular profit from remittances.
With respect to the effects of remittances for sending countries of labour migrants,
different views are currently discussed. First of all, a number of positive impacts are
expected, as remittances provide the home country’s economy with foreign exchange
and additional means for consumption and investment. Although some studies found
remittances to primarily increase family consumption but not investments in productive
assets (Taylor 1992), there is evidence that both, the spending of remittances for con-
sumption and for investment will sustain economic growth (Ratha 2003). However, re-
mittances might deteriorate the payment position of the economy (Dutch disease) and
have distributive effects as well, as remittances are only transferred to a part of the home
countries’ population therefore potentially leading to wealth disparities and social ten-
sions (Buch and Kuckulenz 2004). Nevertheless remittances provide an important and
stable additional source of income, which in the case of transition countries results in a
reduction of poverty, at least in the short-run (Manssor and Quillin 2006: 67).
Figure 5:  Foreign direct investment (FDI), development aid and remittances
















Source: World Bank Development Indicators
In the recent discussions on the consequences of migrations in Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union, brain drain has been a crucial topic, although the dimensions
of brain drain are difficult to identify, due to a lack of data. According to survey studies,
conducted with Ukrainian migrants in the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Portu-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, Working Papers Nr.267
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gal, a remarkable number of labour migrants from the Ukraine are highly educated, al-
though they perform low-skilled work in the receiving economies.
11
Concerning the effects of brain drain, usually negative economic consequences are
associated with the emigration of highly-skilled professionals. However, recent studies
have shown that the emigration of highly-skilled may encourage natives left behind to
accumulate skills to also have an option for emigration. If these natives delay emigration
and actually fill the gaps of skilled emigrants, negative economic effects would be re-
duced (Lundborg and Rechea 2002). Because the proportion of tertiary-educated persons
in the Ukraine is high, the negative consequences of brain drain might have been miti-
gated. Furthermore, the increase of the enrolment ratio in tertiary education in the
Ukraine that occurred between 1998/99 and 2002/2003 indicates a potential compensa-
tion of brain drain (see table 7).
Table 7:  Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary level in the Ukraine





In the case highly-skilled migrants move back home after having acquired new skills
abroad, they may contribute to the economic prosperity in their country of origin. In
addition to valuable management experience, entrepreneurial skills and access to global
networks, returning skilled migrants may even bring venture capital, enhancing eco-
nomic growth and welfare at home. In less favourable conditions, comparatively skilled
labour migrants return who have been occupied in jobs and sectors that required low
qualifications (brain waste). Although these migrants can be expected to bring money
back, positive consequences of migration on workers’ experience are not likely to mate-
rialize.
                                                
11 In the Netherlands, a survey found 88% of questioned Ukrainian migrants having a tertiary education;
while in Portugal 69% of the respondents in a survey study were highly educated (Shakhno and Pool
2005, Baganha et al. 2004).Migration policy challenges
25
4 European Union policy response towards external migration 
challenges: a first look
After the European Union abolished internal border controls in 1997, common rules
regarding visas, asylum rights and checks at external borders were adopted. With the
enlargement of the European Union, a new migration space opened up at the common
external borders in the East which made the need for a comprehensive European Union
migration policy evident. As has been pointed out by European Union organizations and
by NGO’s (for example the United Nations and the International Organization for Mi-
gration) the basic challenge for a comprehensive European Union migration policy is to
move from migration control towards migration management in order to realize the po-
tential gains of migration movements and to minimize its burden for receiving and
sending states.
So far the European Union has put most emphasis on the control and restriction of
migration flows, to ensure what is considered the internal security of the European Un-
ion and to protect the labour markets and welfare systems of its member states. To a
certain extend, this policy contradicted the new neighbourhood policy, admitted by the
European Union commission in 2003 which aimed to strengthen the cooperation be-
tween the enlarged Europe and the countries bordering in the South and the East, such
as the Ukraine (Aliboni 2005). Whereas European Union countries were primarily inter-
ested in an increased cooperation with migrant sending states neighbouring the Euro-
pean Union in the field of migration restriction and border control, the neighbouring non
European Union states were demanding simplified visa procedures and an ease of access
to European Union labour markets.
In managing migration movements from non European Union states, the enlarged
European Union has agreed to address the following topics in a common effort: the
control of external borders (preventing illegal migration and human smuggling and traf-
ficking), the creation of a common asylum law and – in the longer run – the regulation
of labour migrations. With respect to external border controls, i.e. fighting an expected
inflow of illegal immigrants and preventing human smuggling and trafficking, the Euro-
pean Union primarily focused on traditional border security policy as well as on legal
measures discouraging illegal immigrants and fighting people, involved in human
smuggling and trafficking. First of all, the European Union strongly supported the new
East European Union border states with financial and logistic resources to improve ex-
ternal border control.
12 In a similar way, the negotiations with non European Union
neighbouring states, such as the Ukraine focused on border security and immigration
restraint. This policy approach has been reinforced by the agreement on the readmission
of illegal migrants between the European Union and the Ukraine which has been signed
in October 2006. In the view of the European Union this treaty has been a precondition
for the negotiation of a simplified visa regime for Ukrainian citizens travelling into the
European Union.
                                                
12 The European Union provided more than 900 million ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
new EU member states to finance initiatives at the new external borders of the Union.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, Working Papers Nr.267
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In the field of asylum and refugee migration, the European Union member states
reached a general agreement on minimum standards for granting and withdrawing refu-
gee status in the European Union in April 2004. However, in the view of leading refugee
assisting organizations, the European Union minimum standards on refugee protection
were a step back with respect to asylum rights. The standards of refugee protection were
considered to be minimal, indicating that asylum agreements have been reached at the
lowest common denominator. The policy objective to reduce the inflow of asylum seek-
ers and irregular migrants has materialized in the safe country concept which excludes
persons from demanding asylum who either are citizens or enter from a country, defined
safe.
While the European Union has decided on a number of common regulations with re-
spect to border controls and asylum procedures, labour migrations into the European
Union have not yet been regulated on a common base. In recent years most European
Union member states competed for highly-skilled labour migrants while the immigra-
tion of low-skilled workers was seen with concern. However, unskilled, flexible labour
is in demand in some sectors of a number of European Union economies, thus opposing
a policy that tries to prevent the immigration of people, performing unskilled jobs (Cas-
tles 2006). In this context it has been proposed to work out policies – for example flexi-
ble systems for temporary and circular labour migration – that match the domestic secto-
ral demand for low-skilled migrant workers in European Union countries with the high
migration potential in non European Union states, prepared to perform low-skilled work
(GCIM 2005: 18). Nevertheless, these policies have to be backed by a strong enforce-
ment of rules on workers rights, to avoid the formation of a second-class category of
workers.
With respect to the planned common management of labour migrations, several
European Union policy proposals have been presented so far which intended to channel
labour migrations according to labour market requirements. A basic suggestion was to
define the conditions of entry and residence of third country nationals with respect to
categories of immigrants, such as seasonal workers, intra-corporate transferees, espe-
cially skilled migrants and remunerated trainees. In addition a common fast-track proce-
dure was proposed to admit migrants in the case of specific labour market and skill gaps
(COM 2004: 5). While European Union member states in general agreed upon the ne-
cessity to introduce common European Union criteria for labour migration from non
European Union countries, it was demanded to regulate the number of economic immi-
grants to be admitted on the national level.
Experience with labour migrations in many European Union countries show that mi-
grant workers tend to not return home if the chance to come back to the immigrant
country is low. Thus the proposition has been formulated to guarantee an admission
preference to those economic migrants who have already worked for some years in the
European Union before returning temporarily back to their home country. This proce-
dure could encourage “brain circulation” as migrant workers can count on a more fa-
vourable admission treatment if they wish to come back to a European Union country,
after having returned to their country of origin.Migration policy challenges
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In order to manage labour migrations more effectively in the interest of sending and
receiving countries alike, the European Union envisaged a closer cooperation with the
sending countries of labour migrants. A step in this direction was the effort to provide
solid information on the conditions of entry and work permissions into the European
Union. This will be accomplished by setting up a European Union Immigration Portal
and by the revision and development of the European Job Mobility Portal (EURES).
Besides, the problem of “brain drain” has been put on the agenda which should be ad-
dressed in a common initiative of sending and receiving states, primarily by encouraging
return or circular movements.
In general, recent intentions of the European Union to regulate labour migrations
from outside have favoured the support of short-term and circular movements. To a
certain extend, this is a reasonable policy option, particularly because migrants from non
European Union states in the East seem to prefer to return home in the longer run. Nev-
ertheless this policy approach bears risks, because short-term labour migrants who hap-
pen to stay in the longer run potentially face constant marginalization in the receiving
country (de Palo et al. 2006).￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, Working Papers Nr.267
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5 Summary and conclusion
After becoming independent in 1991, the Ukraine turned into a new migration space
attracting and sending migrants to the successor states of the USSR and to the West.
Whereas ethnic return movements dominated in the beginning of the 1990ies, economi-
cally motivated migrations prevailed in later years. This study demonstrated that migra-
tions from the Ukraine into European Union countries have increased recently and that a
growing migration potential is envisaged in the years to come. Although a considerable
part of these movements are expected to be temporary or circular, European Union
countries face a potentially substantial labour migration from the Ukraine. As the num-
ber of Ukrainian citizens willing to enter the European Union will almost certainly ex-
ceed the legal opportunities currently in force, illegal migrations are likely to occur.
In analyzing recent labour movements from the Ukraine into European Union coun-
tries, it becomes clear that some European Union states are particularly addressed by
Ukrainian labour migrations. Whereas high income differences and a lack of job op-
portunities in the sending country trigger these movements in general, they are addition-
ally based on traditional migration patterns and network relations in states such as Ger-
many, Poland, Hungary, the Czech and the Slovak Republic. In other countries, such as
Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, labour migrations from the Ukraine have developed in
the absence of migrant networks, cultural and political ties. In these cases, the demand
for low-skilled labour in segmented markets, particularly in the nontraded goods sectors
of the economy seems to have supported the movement of Ukrainian labour migrants.
With respect to the characteristics of Ukrainian migrants in European Union states,
comparatively skilled persons – working in low-skilled jobs - prevail, who mostly fa-
vour short-term and circular movements. Furthermore, the inflow from the Ukraine into
European Union countries is dominated by females in some European Union countries
and by males in others, depending on the demand structure for migrant labour. Con-
cerning the choice of destination regions, the movements between the Ukraine and
European Union countries reveal an increasing regional diversity since the end of the
1990ies.
Although most European Union countries react reluctantly towards (labour) immi-
gration from outside, long-term demographic projections point to its necessity in the
light of a decreasing and ageing population in nearly all European Union states. While
national migration experiences and national migration policies are different in European
Union member states, the free movement of people within the territory of the European
Union which signed the Schengen agreement resulted in the dependence of each mem-
ber state on the immigration practice and policy of the others. Thus a common European
Union migration policy was envisaged, aiming at the installation of a comprehensive
and cooperative migration system which facilitates the movement of legal (labour) mi-
grants, controls asylum seekers as well as refugees and prevents illegal border crossings.
In response to a considerably migration pressure from outside its territory, the European
Union additionally opted for an increasing cooperation with migrants’ sending states.
Although the European Union has depicted a number of important issues in the contextMigration policy challenges
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of common migration regulations, many of the proposed policy measurements are still
indeterminate, particularly in the case of low-skilled labour movements.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, Working Papers Nr.267
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